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Abstract. We consider a multi-agent model for fair division of mixed
manna (i.e. items for which agents can have positive, zero or negative
utilities), in which agents have additive utilities for bundles of items.
For this model, we give several general impossibility results and special
possibility results for three common fairness concepts (i.e. EF1, EFX,
EFX3) and one popular efficiency concept (i.e. PO). We also study how
these interact with common welfare objectives such as the Nash, disutility
Nash and egalitarian welfares. For example, we show that maximizing
the Nash welfare with mixed manna (or minimizing the disutility Nash
welfare) does not ensure an EF1 allocation whereas with goods and the
Nash welfare it does. We also prove that an EFX3 allocation may not
exist even with identical utilities. By comparison, with tertiary utilities,
EFX and PO allocations, or EFX3 and PO allocations always exist. Also,
with identical utilities, EFX and PO allocations always exist. For these
cases, we give polynomial-time algorithms, returning such allocations and
approximating further the Nash, disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares
in special cases.
Keywords: Social choice; Fair division; Mixed Manna; Nash welfare
1 Introduction
Fair division is the problem of allocating resources to agents [21]. We consider a
version of the problem with mixed manna, in which the resources are indivisible
items and can be classified into three types: mixed goods, pure bads and dummy
bads. The mixed goods are items valued positively by some agents while valued
non-positively by the other agents. These are goods whenever they are valued
non-negatively by all agents, and pure goods whenever they are valued positively
by all agents. The pure bads are items valued negatively by all agents. The
dummy bads generate zero utilities for some agents and negative utilities for
the other agents. Some related theoretical settings already use our model (e.g.
“good allocations”, “chore allocations” and “allocation of objective goods and
chores”) [6]. Some related practical applications of our model include allocations
of donated food products (e.g. [2], https://www.foodbank.org.au/), allocations
of time-based services (e.g. [23], https://timebanks.org/) and matchings of tasks
(e.g. [29], https://www.airtasker.com/).
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In this paper, we advance the “state-of-the-art” for the model of mixed manna
by investigating how common normative properties of allocations such as EF1
(i.e. the envy of an agent is eliminated by removing some item), EFX (i.e. the
envy of an agent is eliminated by removing any item) and PO (i.e. if some agent
gets strictly higher utility in some other allocation, then some other agent gets
strictly lower utility) interact with welfare objectives in these allocations such
as the Nash welfare (i.e. the product of agents’ utilities), the disutility Nash
welfare (i.e. the product of agents’ disutilities) and the egalitarian welfare (i.e.
the minimum agent’s utility). We also propose a new and stronger version of
EFX, namely EFX3, that requires EFX over all items, EFX only over the mixed
goods and EFX only over the pure bads. We thus study further how this stronger
fairness concept relates to the considered welfare objectives.
Existing works for fair division of mixed manna already study some of these
interactions. Some of their approaches are successful and some others are un-
successful. For example, in the setting with only goods, Caragiannis et al. [16]
proved that a natural modification of the Nash welfare maximizing rule sat-
isfies both EF1 and PO. This appealing result suffers unfortunately from the
high computational complexity of the rule. Indeed, computing allocations that
maximize this welfare is NP-hard even in a simple setting such as the one with
pure goods and identical additive utilities [25, 28, 31]. Perhaps, the most relevant
observation for us is that these nice and elegant results break in our setting, sup-
posing that some of the mixed goods are valued with strictly negative utilities
by some of the agents. We give shortly examples for this observation.
Other prior works have considered optimizing other welfares in the case of
bads such as the disutility Nash welfare. We believe that it seems natural to
minimize this welfare as then agents would tend to receive bundles of bads
they disvalue least. Unfortunately, this approach does not give us any fairness
guarantees. Say, we wish to minimize this welfare over the set of all agents. It is
easy to notice that each allocation that gives all bads to some agent minimizes
the disutility Nash welfare. Clearly, such allocations falsify EF1. This is true
even if we insist that each agent receives at least one bad. For example, Aziz et
al. [5] observed that minimizing this welfare under this assumption violates EF1
even when agents have identical utilities for bads, in which case each complete
allocation of the bads is PO.
An alternative approach is to look at allocations that maximize the disutil-
ity Nash welfare. One drawback of this approach is that each such allocation
tends to give to agents bundles of their most disvalued bads. Nevertheless, such
allocations are evidently the only ones that satisfy both EF1 and PO in some
problems with bads. To see this, consider a problem with n agents and k · n
identical bads. It is easy to see that each allocation where some agent receives
at least (k + 1) bads is not EF1 because there is some other agent with strictly
less than k bads. On the other hand, each EF1 alloction gives exactly k bads to
each agent and it is further maximal for the disutility Nash welfare. As a result,
an algorithm returns an EF1 allocation in such problems iff it maximizes the
disutility Nash welfare.
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Maximizing the disutility Nash welfare is surprisingly related to maximizing
the egalitarian welfare. To see this, consider again a problem with n agents and
k ·n identical bads. An allocation that maximizes the egalitarian welfare gives to
each agent exactly k bads. As we argued previously, such an allocation maximizes
the disutility Nash welfare. It is trivial to see that the opposite direction holds
as well in such problems.
In fact, some existing works consider the approximate envy-freeness guaran-
tees of the maximal egalitarian allocations. For example, Plaut and Roughgarden
[27] prove that the leximin solution is EFX and PO with identical additive util-
ities. This solution selects the allocation which maximizes firstly the minimum
utility and then, if there are multiple allocations which achieve that minimum
utility, it chooses among those the allocation which maximizes the second mini-
mum utility, and so on. Clearly, the leximin solution maximizes the egalitarian
welfare. However, it is well-known that finding the leximin solution can require
exponential time for general utilities [18], in which case maximizing the egali-
tarian welfare may not guarantee even EF1 (see [16] for examples).
2 Our results
We advance the “state-of-the-art” in fair division of mixed manna by presenting
several non-trivial contributions, primarily a number of general impossibility
results and three polynomial-time algorithms for a number of special possibility
results.
– General utilities : With mixed goods, we show that maximizing the Nash
welfare does not give us any EF1 or PO guarantees (Example 1). With pure
bads, maximizing or minimizing the disutility Nash welfare is not related to
EF1 (Examples 2 and 3). Also, we prove that an EFX3 allocation may not
exist even with identical utilities (Example 4).
– Tertiary utilities: We give two algorithms, one for EFX and PO (Theorem 1)
and another for EFX3 and PO (Theorem 2) allocations. Hence, an EFX3 al-
location exists in this domain. The EFX algorithm maximizes the egalitarian
welfare (Lemma 1) whilst the EFX3 algorithm may not do that (Lemma 2).
– Identical utilities : We give an algorithm for EFX and PO (Theorem 3) al-
locations. We further report a number of tight approximation guarantees of
this algorithm wrt the Nash welfare with the pure goods and the disutility
Nash welfare with pure bads (Lemmas 3 and 4).
We conclude our paper with two observations: (1) our notion of EFX3 belongs
to a wider class of fairness concepts, (2) the Nash welfare of the leximin solution is
1.061-approximation of the egalitarian welfare of the MNW solution. We believe
that these observations open up interesting future directions.
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3 Related work
One line of recent research studies various approximations of envy-freeness (i.e.
EF) (see e.g. [3, 8, 22]). For instance, the idea of relaxing envy-freeness up to one
item was for first time formally captured by means of EF1 in [14]. Later on, Cara-
giannis et al. [16] proposed EFX that is weaker than EF but stronger than EF1.
It remains an open question if EFX allocations exist in general. Furthermore, for
the model with mixed manna, Aziz et al. [6] submitted the existence and com-
putability of EFX allocations as “an interesting line of research”. In our paper,
we make a step forward and give two algorithms for EFX allocations with identi-
cal and tertiary utilities: the Nash-Max-Tertiary and Max-Min-Identical
algorithms. In addition, we define a new fairness concept EFX3, being stronger
than EFX. With identical utilities, we show that EFX3 allocations may not ex-
ist in some problems unlike EFX allocations. With tertiary utilities, we give an
algorithm that returns an EFX3 allocation: the Nash-Max-Min-Tertiary al-
gorithm. With just goods, our algorithms degenerate to some existing algorithms
from Barman et al. [8].
Another line of recent research investigates various welfares for fair division
problems. For example, we mentioned the work of Caragiannis et al. [16] who
proved that maximizing the Nash welfare satisfies EF1 and PO for the case of
goods. We show that this result ceases to hold for the case of mixed goods. Fur-
ther, the product of disutilities was considered mainly in the context of divisible
items (e.g. [11, 12]). In our work, we focus on indivisible items. The leximin so-
lution, maximizing the egalitarian welfare, was developed as a metric of fairness
in and of itself (see e.g. [30, 32, 33]), and has been used before in fair division,
though typically for randomized allocations (e.g. [9]). Again, this one was used
only for divisions of goods. We report some approximation guarantess of our
algorithms wrt these welfare objectives. For example, the Max-Min-Identical
algorithm with just pure goods (bads) returns an allocation that is an 1.061-
approximation of the maximum geometric mean of the (disutility) Nash welfare.
Moreover, the Nash-Max-Tertiary algorithm maximizes the egalitarian wel-
fare over all items.
Some other recent works give polynomial-time algorithms for fair and efficient
allocations. For example, Aziz et al. [6] gave two such algorithms (i.e. the gen-
eralized Lipton’s algorithm and the double round-robin algorithm) that return
EF1 allocations in problems with mixed manna. Unfortunately, the allocations
returned by them may not be PO even in the case of goods (see e.g. [16, 27]).
Further, Barman, Murthy and Vaish [7] recently presented a pseudo-polynomial-
time algorithm for computing an allocation that is EF1 and PO for goods. They
show that this algorithm provides a polynomial-time 1.45-approximation for the
Nash welfare maximization problem. In fact, this is the best-known approxima-
tion factor for this problem. We add to these results as our algorithms require
polynomial-time and also return EFX and PO allocations. Some more related
works are [4, 10, 13, 15].
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4 Model
We consider a set [n] = {1, . . . , n} of n ∈ N agents and a set [m] = {1, . . . ,m} of
m ∈ N indivisible items. We let each a ∈ [n] have some cardinal utility ua(o) ∈ R
for each o ∈ [m]. If ua(o) > 0, then o is a good for a. If ua(o) = 0, then o is a
dummy for a. If ua(o) < 0, then o is a bad for a. We consider (1) mixed goods
1
(i.e. items that are goods for some agents and not goods for the other agents),
(2) pure bads (i.e. items that are bads for all agents) and (3) dummy bads (i.e.
items that are dummies for some agents and bads for the other agents). We write
[m]+ = {o ∈ [m]|∃a ∈ [n] : ua(o) > 0}, [m]− = {o ∈ [m]|∀a ∈ [n] : ua(o) < 0}
and [m]0 = {o ∈ [m]|∀a ∈ [n] : ua(o) ≤ 0, ∃b ∈ [n] : ub(o) = 0}. We let m
+, m−
and m0 denote the cardinalities of [m]+, [m]−, and [m]0.
For sets N ⊆ [n] and O ⊆ [m], an (complete) allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) of
all items fromO to agents fromN is such that ∪a∈NAa = O and ∪a∈[n]\NAa = ∅.
Thus, we write A(N,O) for the set of all complete allocations of the items from
O to the agents from N . We are mainly interested in complete allocations of all
items from [m]. For each a ∈ [n] and M ⊆ [m], we write ua(M) for the bundle
utility of a for the items in M . We write ua(o) for ua({o}). We consider additive
bundle utilities. That is, ua(M) =
∑
o∈M ua(o). We say that these utilities are
identical iff, for each M ⊆ [m], ua(M) = ub(M) for each a, b ∈ [n] and, for this
reason, we write u(M) in this case. We say that the cardinal utilities are tertiary
iff, for each a ∈ [n] and each o ∈ [m], ua(o) ∈ {−α, 0, α} where α ∈ N>0.
5 Axiomatic Properties
We next define formally some concepts that we use throughout the paper: envy-
freeness, Pareto optimality and welfare optimality.
5.1 Envy-freeness
We consider two approximations of envy-freeness of allocations [19]. These are
EF1 and EFX. For goods, EF1 is proposed in [14] whereas EFX is from [16].
However, for our model, we use their generalizations from [6].
Definition 1 (EF) An allocation A is envy-free (EF) if, for all a, b ∈ [n],
ua(Aa) ≥ ua(Ab).
Definition 2 (EF1) An allocation A is envy-free up to some item (EF1) if, for
all a, b ∈ [n], either ua(Aa) ≥ ua(Ab) or ∃o ∈ Aa ∪Ab such that ua(Aa \ {o}) ≥
ua(Ab \ {o}).
Definition 3 (EFX) An allocation A is envy-free up to any item (EFX) if, for
all a, b ∈ [n], both of the two following conditions hold:
1 We say that the mixed goods are simply goods whenever no agent has a strictly
negative utility for any of them, and the goods are simply pure goods whenever each
agent has a strictly positive utility for each of them.
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1. ∀o ∈ Aa such that ua(o) < 0: ua(Aa \ {o}) ≥ ua(Ab),
2. ∀o ∈ Ab such that ua(o) > 0: ua(Aa) ≥ ua(Ab \ {o}).
We further define a stronger form of EFX, enforcing EFX over the items from
[m]+, [m]− and [m]. For a given A = (A1, . . . , An), we let A
+ = (A+1 , . . . , A
+
n )
and A− = (A−1 , . . . , A
−
n ) where A
+
a = Aa ∩ [m]
+ and A−a = Aa ∩ [m]
− for each
a ∈ [n].
Definition 4 (EFX3) An allocation A is EFX3 if, for all a, b ∈ [n], A is EFX
for [m], A+ is EFX for [m]+ and A− is EFX for [m]−.
5.2 Pareto optimality
We consider Pareto optimality as a measure of economic efficiency. Pareto op-
timality is proposed by Vilfredo Pareto long time ago in his seminal work [26].
We next define this concept in our model.
Definition 5 (PO) An allocation A is Pareto optimal (PO) if there is no allo-
cation B such that ∀a ∈ [n]: ua(Ba) ≥ ua(Aa) and ∃b ∈ [n]: ub(Bb) > ub(Ab).
5.3 Welfare optimality
One well-studied social objective is the Nash welfare. The Nash welfare (or NW )
in A ∈ A(N,O) is given by:
NW(A) =
∏
a∈N
ua(Aa).
Another interesting social objective is the product of disutilities. The disu-
tility Nash welfare (or dNW ) in A ∈ A(N,O) is given by:
dNW(A) =
∏
a∈N
(−ua(Aa)).
We also consider the minimum agent’s utility in an allocation. The egalitarian
welfare (or EW ) in A ∈ A(N,O) is given by:
EW(A) = min
a∈N
ua(Aa).
We pay a minor attention in our work to allocations that are optimal or
sub-optimal for a given welfare W. For this reason, we define such allocations.
Definition 6 (MW) An allocation A ∈ A(N,O) is maximal for the welfare W
(MW) if, for each B ∈ A(N,O), W(A) ≥W(B).
Definition 7 (β-approximation) For a fixed β ∈ [0, 1], an allocation A ∈ A(N,
O) is β-approximation of W if, for each B ∈ A(N,O) that is maximal for W,
W(A) ≥ β ·W(B).
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6 General additive utilities
We begin with general utilities. With goods, it is well-known that maximizing
the Nash welfare, over a largest set N of agents to which one can simultaneously
provide strictly positive utilities2, selects an allocation that is EF1 and PO [16].
Surprisingly, with mixed goods, these results do not hold for any of the MNW
allocations from A(N, [m]+). We show this in Example 1.
Example 1 Let us consider the following fair division problem with 2 agents
and 3 mixed goods. Based on the below utilities, the largest set of agents who
share positive utilities is [2].
agent mix. good 1 mix. good 2 pure good 3
1 2 −4 1
2 −4 2 1
The allocations A = ({2, 3}, {1}) and B = ({2}, {1, 3}) maximize the Nash
welfare, achieving a value of 12. Neither A nor B is Pareto optimal because the
agents are better off whenever they swap mixed goods 1 and 2. Further, A and
B are not EF1. Indeed, u1(A1 \ {2}) = 1 < 2 = u1(A2), u1(A1 \ {3}) = −4 <
2 = u1(A2) and u1(A1) = −3 < 0 = u1(A2 \ {1}). Similarly, agent 2 is not EF1
of agent 1 in the allocation B. ⋄
With pure bads, we might wish to minimize the disutility Nash welfare over
a largest set M of agents to which one can simultaneously provide strictly neg-
ative utilities3. Unfortunately, there are problems where none of the optimal
allocations is even EF1. We demonstrate this in Example 2.
Example 2 Consider a simple fair division problem with 2 agents and 4 iden-
tical pure bads. The largest set of agents who share negative utilities is [2]. We
note that each allocation is PO.
agent pure bad 1 pure bad 2 pure bad 1 pure bad 2
1 −1 −1 −1 −1
2 −1 −1 −1 −1
Each algorithm that minimizes the disutility Nash welfare would give zero
bads to one of the agents. This allocation is not EF1. Each algorithm that mini-
mizes the disutility Nash welfare, subject to the constraint that each agent should
receive at least one pure bad, would give one pure bad to one of the agents and
three pure bads to the other agent. Again, it should be clear that this allocation
violates EF1. ⋄
2 A set N corresponds to the set of agents’ vertices in a maximum matching in the
bipartite graph ([n], E) where (a, o) ∈ E iff a ∈ [n], o ∈ [m]+ and ua(o) > 0. Such a
matching can be computed in O(max{n2.5,m2.5}) time [20].
3 A set M can be computed in O(n) time. In fact, M is a fixed subset of m− agents
from [n] if m− < n and M = [n] if m− ≥ n.
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By Example 2, we conclude that there is no algorithm that minimizes the
disutility Nash welfare and returns an EF1 allocation. For this reason, we next
attempt to maximize this welfare over a largest set M . As we show later, this
approach gives us nice fairness guarantees in two special cases. However, in the
general case, there are problems where both PO and EF1 may be falsified by
each MdNW allocation from A(M, [m]−). We illustrate this in Example 3.
Example 3 Again, consider a simple fair division problem with 2 agents and
3 pure bads. Given the following utilities, the largest set of agents who share
negative utilities is [2].
agent pure bad 1 pure bad 2 pure bad 3
1 −2 −1 −4
2 −1 −2 −4
The allocations A = ({1, 3}, {2}) and B = ({1}, {2, 3}) are MdNW with
welfare of 12. These are not Pareto optimal because agents are better off if they
swap pure bads 1 and 2. Also, A and B are not EF1. Indeed, u1(A1 \ {1}) =
−4 < −1 = u1(A2) and u1(A1 \ {3}) = −2 < −1 = u1(A2). Similarly, agent 2
is not EF1 of agent 1 in B. ⋄
We next consider EFX3. This property coincides with EFX whenever the
problem contains just goods or just bads. It remains an open question if EFX
allocations exist in each problem with general utilities. However, EFX allocations
do exist with identical utilities in these settings [1]. By comparison, in our setting
with mixed manna, EFX3 is strictly stronger than EFX and it may not be
achievable even in this domain. We show this in Example 4.
Example 4 Suppose that there are 2 agents requesting 3 pure goods and 3 pure
bads. We note that one EFX allocation gives items 1, 2, 3, 4 to agent 1 and
items 5, 6 to agent 2.
items agent 1 agent 2
pure good 1 7 7
pure good 2 6 6
pure good 3 5 5
pure bad 4 −100 −100
pure bad 5 −2 −2
pure bad 6 −1 −1
However, there is no EFX3 allocation. There are two EFX allocations of
the pure goods and two EFX allocations of the pure bads: A = ({1}, {2, 3}),
B = ({2, 3}, {1}), C = ({4}, {5, 6}) and D = ({5, 6}, {4}). If we unite (“agent-
wise”) A and C, then u(A1 ∪ C1 \ {4}) = 7 < 8 = u(A2 ∪ C2). If we unite A
and D, then u(A2 ∪D2) = −89 < −3 = u(A1 ∪ C1 \ {1}). Hence, the unions of
A and C, or A and D are not EFX3. Similarly, uniting B and C, or B and D
violates EFX3. ⋄
In response to Examples 1, 2, 3 and 4, we report two cases when EFX and
PO can be achieved through maximization of the considered welfares: tertiary
and identical utilities.
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7 Tertiary additive utilities
We continue with tertiary utilities. In this domain, it is easy to see that an agent
is envy-free up to any item whenever they are envy-free up to some item. That
is, EF1 degenerates to EFX.
We, thus, give two algorithms for EFX and PO allocations. Both algorithms
degenerate to an existing algorithm (i.e. the Alg-Binary algorithm from [8])
for goods valued with utilities from {0, α}. As a result, they run in O(2 ·m · (n+
1) · ln(n · m)) time. However, they work also in our setting with utilities from
{−α, 0, α}.
One of these algorithms returns an EFX and PO allocation, maximizing the
egalitarian welfare but it does not bound the envy between agents for pure bads.
The other one returns an EFX3 and PO allocation, bounding by α this envy but
it does not maximize the egalitarian welfare.
7.1 Algorithm for EFX and PO
We can compute in polynomial time an allocation that is MNW over the mixed
goods, satisfying further EFX and PO. We next present a simple algorithm for
this task.
Algorithm 1 Nash-Max-Tertiary([n], [m], (ua(o))n×m)
1: procedure Nash-Max-Tertiary([n], [m], (ua(o))n×m)
2: ∀a ∈ [n] : Aa ← ∅
3: if [m]+ 6= ∅ then
4: N ← a largest set given [m]+
5: I ← ([m]+, ∅, . . . , ∅)
6: A←Alg-Binary(N, [m]+, (ua(o))n×m, I)
7: for o ∈ [m]− do
8: MaxUtil(A)← {a ∈ [n]|∀b ∈ [n] : ua(Aa) ≥ ub(Ab)}
9: pick a ∈ MaxUtil(A)
10: Aa ← Aa ∪ {o}
11: for o ∈ [m]0 do
12: pick a ∈ {b ∈ [n]|ub(o) = 0}
13: Aa ← Aa ∪ {o}
14: return A
Algorithm 1 works in three steps. Initially, in the first step, Algorithm 1
computes a feasible subset N4 and an allocation A over N that is MNW for the
items from [m]+. For this purpose, Algorithm 1 calls the existing Alg-Binary
algorithm from [8].
4 Barman et al. [8] assumed that N = [n]. In our work, we drop this assumption. For
this reason, we need to compute one such set at line 4 in Algorithm 1.
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Afterwards, in the second step, Algorithm 1 allocates greedily the items from
[m]− to agents, diminishing the utility of each agent with maximum utility in A
until all of these utilities become equal to the second maximum utility of an agent
in A, supposing that there are enough items in [m]−. In this way, Algorithm 1
computes another allocation and repeats this process with this allocation until
all items from [m]− are allocated.
At the end, in the third step, Algorithm 1 allocates each item from [m]0 to
an agent who values it with zero utility, returning a complete allocation of all
items from [m]. We next prove that this one is EFX and PO.
Theorem 1 With tertiary additive utilities, the Nash-Max-Tertiary algo-
rithm returns an EFX and PO allocation.
Proof. Items from [m]+ (Lines 3-6 in Algorithm 1): The allocation of
items from [m]+ is done by calling the Alg-Binary algorithm5. This algorithm
takes as input N , [m]+ and some allocation I that is complete for [m]+ (e.g. see
line 5 in Algorithm 1), and returns as output an MNW allocation A over N for
[m]+. Hence, A is EFX and PO by the result of Caragiannis et al. [16].
Items from [m]− (Lines 7-10 in Algorithm 1): The allocation of items
from [m]− proceeds in rounds. In round 1, we let σ(A) denote the utility order
induced by A. Wlog, u1(A1) ≥ u2(A2) ≥ . . . ≥ un(An). In this round, all agents
with maximum utility in A (i.e. u1(A1)) receive items from [m]
− in a round-
robin fashion until the utility of each of these agents reaches the second utility
level in σ(A). This process may terminate before this happens if there are not
enough items in [m]− for this to happen. At the end of round 1, the algorithm
returns some allocation B1. If there are unallocated items in [m]
−, the algorithm
proceeds to the next round.
In round k > 1, we let Bk−1 denote the partial allocation returned after
the first (k − 1) rounds and σ(Bk−1) the utility order induced by Bk−1. Wlog,
u1(B
k−1
1 ) ≥ u2(B
k−1
2 ) ≥ . . . ≥ un(B
k−1
n ). In this round, all agents with maxi-
mum utility in Bk−1 (i.e. u1(B
k−1
1 )) receive items from [m]
− in a round-robin
fashion until the utility of each of these agents reaches the second utility level in
σ(Bk−1), obtaining another allocation Bk at the end of round k. For each round
k, it is easy to see that the allocation Bk is EFX and PO because A is EFX and
PO, Bk−1 is EFX and PO and, at round k, items from [m]− are allocated in a
round-robin fashion to agents with maximum utility in σ(Bk−1).
Items from [m]0 (Lines 11-14 in Algorithm 1): From an EFX perspec-
tive, it is best if each item from [m]0 is allocated to an agent who has zero
utility for it. Moreover, the sum of agents’ utilities in the final allocation A is
(m+−m−) ·α. Hence, PO follows. Otherwise, this sum in a Pareto-improvement
of A would be strictly more than (m+ −m−) · α. ⋄
5 The Alg-Binary algorithm constructs a directed graph in which there is a vertex
for each agent a ∈ N and there is an directed edge from a ∈ N to b ∈ N iff there
is an item o ∈ [m]+ with ub(o) = α > 0 and o is currently allocated to agent a. It
follows that the algorithm’s output would not change supposing the negative utilities
of agents from [n] for items from [m]+ are replaced by zero utilities.
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We further prove that Algorithm 1 returns an allocation that maximizes the
egalitarian welfare over all items.
Lemma 1 With tertiary additive utilities, the algorithm Nash-Max-Tertiary
returns an MEW allocation.
Proof. Let us consider the MNW allocation A returned by Alg-Binary.
We argue that A maximizes the egalitarian welfare over N for [m]+. By PO,
it follows ua(Aa) > 0 for each a ∈ N . Let us assume that there is some other
allocationB such that EW(B) > EW(A). Furthermore, let us consider agent a =
argminc∈N uc(Ac). By fixing Aa and varying the items in the bundle ∪b∈N\{a}Ab
among agents in N \ {a}, we cannot obtain an allocation with a value of the
egalitarian welfare that is greater than EW(A). Therefore, as EW(B) > EW(A),
the allocationB must be obtained by re-allocating the items in A, including those
in Aa, in such a way so that ua(Ba) > ua(Aa). It must be then the case that
agent a likes some items in Ab for some b ∈ N \ {a}. We consider two cases
for agent b. If ub(Ab) ≤ ua(Aa) + α, moving items from Ab to Aa results in
an allocation with egalitarian welfare at most EW(A). If ub(Ab) > ua(Aa) + α,
agent a does not like any item in Ab. Otherwise, moving one such item from Ab
to Aa increases the Nash welfare under A, contradicting its maximality under
A. Consequently, as EW(B) > EW(A), the allocation B must be obtained by
removing items from Aa and/or moving items to Aa from agents with utility
in A that is at most ua(Aa) + α. Wlog, let us remove the subset of items S
from Aa. It follows that moving items to Aa \ S from agents with utility in A
that is at most ua(Aa) + α gives us an allocation with egalitarian welfare at
most EW(A). Therefore, it must be the case that EW(B) ≤ EW(A) holds. We
reached a contradiction with our assumption. Finally, let us next consider the
allocations of items from [m]− and [m]0. From an egalitarian perspective, the
algorithm allocates optimally each of these items. The result follows. ⋄
7.2 Algorithm for EFX3 and PO
We observed examples of problems where the allocation returned by Algorithm 1
gave all pure bads to a single agent simply because they received large enough
utility for the mixed goods. We believe that such an allocation might be perceived
as unfair as it does not bound the envy between agents for pure bads.
By comparison, an MdNW allocation of the pure bads bounds by α this
envy. Additionally, such an allocation maximizes the egalitarian welfare over
these items because it gives to each agent ⌊m−/n⌋ or ⌊m−/n⌋+1 pure bads and
each agent has disutility −α for each pure bad.
In fact, we can compute in polynomial time an allocation of all items whose
sub-allocation over the mixed goods is MNW and sub-allocation over the pure
bads is MdNW, satisfying further EFX3 and PO. Such an allocation bounds by
α the envy between agents for all items from [m], all mixed goods from [m]+
and all pure bads from [m]−, as well as maximizes the egalitarian welfares over
[m]+ and [m]−. We present below an algorithm for this task.
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Algorithm 2 Nash-Max-Min-Tertiary([n], [m], (ua(o))n×m)
1: procedure Nash-Max-Min-Tertiary([n], [m], (ua(o))n×m)
2: ∀a ∈ [n] : Aa ← ∅, Ba ← ∅, Ca ← ∅
3: if [m]+ 6= ∅ then
4: N ← a largest set given [m]+
5: I ← ([m]+, ∅, . . . , ∅)
6: A←Alg-Binary(N, [m]+, (ua(o))n×m, I)
7: if [m]− 6= ∅ then
8: M ← a largest and feasible set given N and [m]−
9: σM,A ← a max-min priority order given M and A
10: B ←Round-Robin(σM,A, [m]−, (ua(o))n×m, A)
11: for o ∈ [m]0 do
12: pick a ∈ {b ∈ [n]|ub(o) = 0}
13: Ca ← Ba ∪ {o}
14: return C
Algorithm 2 makes use of two largest subsets N and M6, subject to the
following feasibility constraint: M ⊆ N if m− ≤ |N | and, otherwise, N ⊆ M .
This one is crucial for the EFX guarantees of the returned allocation. Indeed, if
N∩M = ∅, then this allocation may violate EFX. We illustrate this in Example 5.
Example 5 Let us consider the below problem and the largest subsets N = {1, 2}
and M = {3}. We note that both sets N and M are well-defined.
agent pure good 1 pure good 2 pure bad 3
1 1 1 −1
2 1 1 −1
3 1 1 −1
Algorithm 2, with N and M that do not satisfy the feasibility constraint,
returns A = ({1}, {2}, {3}) or B = ({2}, {1}, {3}). Clearly, A is not EF1 (and,
therefore, EFX): u3(A3) = −1 < 0 = u3(A1 \ {1}) = u3(A2 \ {2}) and u3(A3 \
{3}) = 0 < 1 = u3(A1) = u3(A2). Similarly, B violates EFX as well. ⋄
Algorithm 2 initializes three different allocations A, B and C with empty
bundles and further executes two “if” conditions and one “for” loop. In the first
“if” condition, Algorithm 2 computes an MNW allocation A of the items from
[m]+, using the existing Alg-Binary algorithm.
In the second “if” condition, Algorithm 2 extends A to another allocation
B over some largest and feasible set M , that is MdNW and PO for the items
from [m]−. For this purpose, Algorithm 2 allocates the items from [m]− in a
round-robin fashion, according to a max-min priority order σM,A
7.
6 See footnotes 2 and 3.
7 Wlog, let M = {1, . . . , l} and u1(A1) ≥ . . . ≥ ul(Al). A max-min priority order is an
order of the agents fromM that is consistent with the order induced by their utilities
in A. For example, (1, . . . , l) is one such order in which agent 1 has the max imum
utility and agent l has the minimum utility in A.
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In the “for” loop, Algorithm 2 allocates each item from [m]0 to an agent
who values it with zero utility, extending B to an allocation C. Algorithm 2
terminates by returning the allocation C. We next prove that this returned
allocation is EFX3 and PO.
Theorem 2 With tertiary additive utilities, the Nash-Max-Min-Tertiary al-
gorithm returns an EFX3 and PO allocation.
Proof. Items from [m]+ (Lines 3-6 in Algorithm 2): As we discussed
in Theorem 1, the allocation A returned by the Alg-Binary algorithm is EFX
and PO for the items from [m]+.
Items from [m]− (Lines 7-10 in Algorithm 2): Wlog, [m]− = {1, . . . , j}.
Let these items be allocated from 1 to j. For k from 0 to j, we let Ak denote
the partial allocation of the first k of these j items, extending A. We note that
A0 = A and Aj = B hold.
Step 1. Pareto optimality of Ak: We argue that the allocation Ak is PO for
each fixed k ∈ [j]. The sum of agents’ utilities in each PO allocation of the items
from [m]+ and the first k items from [m]− is m+ ·α− k · α. This is also true for
Ak. Hence, this allocation must be PO. Otherwise, the total utility in an Pareto
improvement of Ak would be strictly higher than m+ · α− k · α.
Step 2. EFX of Ak: We next argue that Ak is EFX by induction on k. In the
base case, let k be 0. The result follows. In the hypothesis case, we assume that
A(k−1) is EFX. In the step case, let us consider round k. Wlog, letM = {1, . . . , l},
u1(A1) ≥ . . . ≥ ul(Al) and σ = σM,A = (1, . . . , l).
Wlog, let it be agent a(k)’s turn in σ to pick item k from [m]−. By the choice
of σ, we next prove that the following property holds.
Property (⋆): In A(k−1), any agent b before agent a(k) in σ is EFX, agent
a(k) is EF and any agent a after agent a(k) in σ is EFX.
In A(k−1), for some s ∈ N>0, let agent b hold s of the first (k−1) items whilst
agents a(k) and a hold each (s− 1) of these items.
For agents b and c before b in σ, ub(A
(k−1)
b ) = ub(Ab)−sα ≥ ub(Ac)−α−sα
by the EFX of A(k−1). Agent c gets s bads in this allocation. Hence, ub(Ac) −
α− sα = ub(A
(k−1)
c )−α. For agents b and c after b in σ, ub(A
(k−1)
b ) = ub(Ab)−
sα ≥ uc(Ac) − sα. Agent c receives either s or (s − 1) bads in A
(k−1). Hence,
uc(Ac) − sα ≥ uc(A
(k−1)
c ) − α. By the PO of A(k−1), it follows uc(A
(k−1)
c ) ≥
ub(A
(k−1)
c ). Agent b is EFX in A(k−1).
For agents a and c before a in σ, ua(A
(k−1)
a ) = ua(Aa)− (s− 1)α ≥ ua(Ac)−
α − (s − 1)α by the EFX of A(k−1). Agent c receives either s or (s − 1) bads
in this allocation. In either case, ua(Ac) − α − (s − 1)α ≥ ua(A
(k−1)
c ) − α. For
agents a and c after a in σ, ua(A
(k−1)
a ) = ua(Aa)− (s− 1)α ≥ uc(Ac)− (s− 1)α.
By the PO of A, it follows uc(Ac) ≥ ua(Ac). Agent c gets (s− 1) bads in A(k−1).
Consequently, uc(Ac) − (s − 1)α ≥ ua(Ac)− (s − 1)α = ua(A
(k−1)
c ). Agent a is
EFX in A(k−1).
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For agents a(k) and b, ua(k)(A
(k−1)
a(k) ) = ua(k)(Aa(k))− (s− 1)α ≥ ua(k)(Ab)−
α − (s − 1)α by the EFX of A(k−1). Agent b gets s bads in this allocation.
Consequently, it follows ua(k)(Ab) − α − (s − 1)α = ua(k)(A
(k−1)
b ). For agents
a(k) and a, ua(k)(A
(k−1)
a(k) ) = ua(k)(Aa(k))− (s− 1)α ≥ ua(Aa)− (s− 1)α. By the
PO of A, it follows ua(Aa) ≥ ua(k)(Aa). Agent a gets (s − 1) bads in A
(k−1).
Therefore, ua(Aa) − (s − 1)α ≥ ua(k)(Aa) − (s − 1)α = ua(k)(A
(k−1)
a ). Thus,
unlike agents a and b, agent a(k) is EF in A(k−1).
Property (⋆) holds. Let us next consider the agents inside M . As agent b is
EFX in A(k−1), it follows that they remain EFX in Ak. As agent a(k) is envy-free
in A(k−1), it follows that they become EFX in Ak after they receive item k as
they value this item with −α. As agent a is EFX in A(k−1), it follows that they
remain EFX in Ak. Also, consider the agents outside M . Each agent b ∈ [n] \M
receives no bads. Hence, they are EFX in Ak because they are EFX in A. Hence,
Ak is EFX.
We also note that the allocation (B1 \A1, . . . , Bn \An) is EFX over the items
from [m]−. Moreover, it is PO for these items as the sum of agents’ utilities in
it is −m− · α. This is the maximal sum possible for these items.
Items from [m]0 (Lines 11-14 in Algorithm 2): As we discussed in
Theorem 1, it is best if each item from [m]0 is allocated to an agent who has
zero utility for it. Hence, the final allocation C is EFX and PO within the set
A([n], [m]) of complete allocations. ⋄
One downside of Algorithm 2 is that it may not maximize the egalitarian
welfare over all items from [m] (unlike Algorithm 1 in Lemma 1). This follows
because Algorithm 2 may give to each agent the same number of pure bads. In
fact, there are problems where each EFX3 and PO allocation does that. As a
result, each algorithm that returns such an allocation would fail to maximize
this welfare as it might be more optimal from an egalitarian perspective to give
all pure bads to the agent with the greatest utility over the mixed goods.
Lemma 2 With tertiary additive utilities, there is no algorithm that returns an
EFX3, PO and MEW allocation.
Proof. The proof is via a simple counter-example. Let us consider a fair division
problem with 2 agents, 2 goods and 2 pure bads.
agent good 1 good 2 pure bad 3 pure bad 4
1 1 1 −1 −1
2 0 0 −1 −1
Each algorithm that returns an PO allocation would give both goods to agent
1. Each algorithm that returns an EFX3 allocation would give one pure bad to
agent 1 and the other pure bad to agent 2. We note that Algorithm 2 does
exactly this. The value of the egalitarian welfare in such an allocation is equal
to −1. However, the maximal egalitarian allocation gives both goods to agent 1
and also both pure bads to agent 1, achieving a welfare of 0. ⋄
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We note that Lemma 2 holds further for algorithms that are guaranteed to
return an allocation which satisfies EFX3 but may falsify PO. For completeness,
we summarize this result.
Corollary 1 With tertiary additive utilities, there is no algorithm that computes
an EFX3 and MEW allocation.
8 Identical additive utilities
We end with identical utilities. In this domain, Pareto optimality follows trivially
because the sum of the agents’ utilities in each complete allocation is equal to∑
o∈[m] u(o).
By Example 4, an EFX3 allocation may not exist. For this reason, we give
just one algorithm that returns an EFX allocation. This algorithm degenerates
to an existing algorithm (i.e. the Alg-Identical algorithm from [8]) for pure
goods, that returns an EFX allocation. However, our algorithm returns such an
allocation in fair division of mixed manna.
Furthermore, it has been proven that maximizing exactly the Nash welfare
in a problem with pure goods or the disutility Nash welfare in a problem with
pure bads selects an EFX allocation [1]. Nevertheless, computing such an allo-
cation is in NP-hard [5, 31]. For this reason, we also consider the approximation
guarantees of our algorithm wrt these welfares in these cases.
8.1 Algorithm for EFX and PO
Interestingly, we can compute in O(m · n) time an EFX allocation. We next
give one algorithm for this task. Algorithm 3 allocates the items one-by-one in
a sequence of non-increasing absolute utility. If the current item is a bad, then
Algorithm 3 gives it to an agent who has currently max imum utility. Otherwise,
Algorithm 3 gives it to an agent who has currently minimum utility.
Algorithm 3 Max-Min-Identical([n], [m], (u(o))n)
1: procedure Max-Min-Identical([n], [m], (u(o))n)
2: ∀a ∈ [n] : Aa ← ∅
3: σ ← (1, . . . ,m) ⊲ wlog, |u(1)| ≥ . . . ≥ |u(m)|
4: for j ← 1 : m,o← σ(j) do
5: if o is a bad then
6: MaxUtil(A)← {a ∈ [n]|∀b ∈ [n] : u(Aa) ≥ u(Ab)}
7: pick a ∈ MaxUtil(A)
8: if o is a good or a dummy then
9: MinUtil(A)← {a ∈ [n]|∀b ∈ [n] : u(Aa) ≤ u(Ab)}
10: pick a ∈ MinUtil(A)
11: Aa ← Aa ∪ {o}
12: return A
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Theorem 3 With identical additive utilities, the Max-Min-Identical algo-
rithm returns an EFX and PO allocation.
Proof. Let us consider the returned allocation. We prove EFX by induction
on o ∈ [m], supposing that σ = (1, . . . ,m) is such that |u(1)| ≥ . . . ≥ |u(m)|.
In the base case, let o be 1. The allocation of item o is clearly EFX. In the
hypothesis, let o be item (j − 1) and suppose that the partially constructed
allocation A = (A1, . . . , An) is EFX. In the step case, let o be item j.
Case 1 : o is a good or a dummy. WLOG, let agent 1 ∈ MinUtil(A) and the
algorithm gives o to agent 1. We note that u(o) ≥ 0. Consider B = (B1, . . . , Bn)
with B1 = A1 ∪ {o} and Ba = Aa for each a ∈ [n] \ {1}. We prove that B is
EFX. For this purpose, we only need to show that, for each a ∈ [n]\{1}, agent a
is EFX of agent 1 and agent 1 is EFX of agent a. For each other pair of agents,
this result follows by the induction hypothesis.
1 → a: We have that u(B1) = u(o) + u(A1) ≥ u(A1). By the hypothesis,
u(A1) ≥ u(Aa \ {g}) for each g ∈ Aa with u(g) > 0 and u(A1 \ {b}) ≥ u(Aa) for
each b ∈ A1 with u(b) < 0. Therefore, u(B1) ≥ u(A1) ≥ u(Aa\{g}) = u(Ba\{g})
and u(B1 \ {b}) ≥ u(Aa \ {b}) ≥ u(Aa) = u(Ba) as Ba = Aa.
a→ 1: We have that u(Aa) ≥ u(A1) as agent 1 ∈ MinUtil(A). Hence, agent
a is envy-free of agent 1 in A and also u(Ba) ≥ u(B1 \ {o}) as Ba = Aa and
B1 \ {o} = A1. As the items are revealed in a non-increasing absolute value,
u(g) ≥ u(o) for each g ∈ A1 with u(g) > 0. Hence, u(B1) ≥ u(B1 \ {o}) ≥
u(B1\{g}) for each g ∈ A1 with u(g) > 0. We also have that u(Aa\{b}) > u(A1)
for each b ∈ Aa with u(b) < 0. Again, due to the order of the items, |u(b)| ≥ u(o).
Therefore, u(Ba \ {b}) ≥ u(Ba) + u(o) = u(Aa) + u(o) as Ba = Aa. In the last
step, we have u(Ba \ {b}) ≥ u(A1) + u(o) = u(B1).
Case 2 : o is a bad. WLOG, let agent 1 ∈ MaxUtil(A) and the algorithm
gives o to agent 1. We note that u(o) < 0. Consider B = (B1, . . . , Bn) with
B1 = A1 ∪{o} and Ba = Aa for each a ∈ [n] \ {1}. We prove that B is EFX. We
show this only for agent 1 and agent a ∈ [n] \ {1}.
1 → a: We have that u(A1) ≥ u(Aa) as 1 ∈ MaxUtil(A). Hence, agent 1
is envy-free of agent a in A and also u(B1 \ {o}) ≥ u(Ba) as Ba = Aa and
B1 \ {o} = A1. As the items are revealed in a non-increasing absolute value,
|u(b)| ≥ |u(o)| for each b ∈ A1 with u(b) < 0. Hence, u(B1 \{b}) ≥ u(B1 \{o}) ≥
u(Ba) for each b ∈ A1 with u(b) < 0. We also have that u(A1) > u(Aa \ {g}) for
each g ∈ Aa with u(g) > 0. Again, due to the order of the items, u(g) ≥ |u(o)|.
Therefore, u(Ba \ {g}) ≤ u(Ba)− |u(o)| = u(Aa)− |u(o)| as Ba = Aa. And, we
have u(Aa)−|u(o)| ≤ u(A1)−|u(o)| = u(B1). Consequently, u(B1) ≥ u(Ba\{g})
for each g ∈ Ba with u(g) > 0.
a → 1: We have that u(B1) = u(o) + u(A1) ≤ u(A1). By the hypothesis,
u(Aa) ≥ u(A1 \ {g}) for each g ∈ A1 with u(g) > 0 and u(Aa \ {b}) ≥ u(A1) for
each b ∈ Aa with u(b) < 0. Therefore, u(Ba) = u(Aa) ≥ u(A1\{g}) ≥ u(B1\{g})
as u(A1) ≥ u(B1) and u(Ba \ {b}) = u(Aa \ {b}) ≥ u(A1) ≥ u(B1) because
Ba = Aa.
The algorithm returns a complete allocation. As we discussed previously,
each such allocation satisfies Pareto optimality. ⋄
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We proceed with the approximation guarantees of Algorithm 3. With pure
goods, Barman et al. [8] proved that an arbitrary EFX allocation A is an 1.061-
approximation of the geometric mean of the maximal Nash welfare. That is,
n
√
NW(A) ≥ 11.061
n
√
NW(AMNW). By Theorem 3, Algorithm 3 returns such an
allocation. We merely summarize this result for completeness.
Lemma 3 With pure goods and identical additive utilities, the algorithm Max-
Min-Identical returns an 1.061-approximation of the geometric mean of the
maximal Nash welfare.
Interestingly, with pure bads, Algorithm 3 approximates further up to the
same tight bound the geometric mean of the maximal disutility Nash welfare,
i.e. n
√
dNW(A) ≥ 11.061
n
√
dNW(AMdNW).
Lemma 4 With pure bads and identical additive utilities, the algorithm Max-
Min-Identical returns an 1.061-approximation of the geometric mean of the
maximal disutility Nash welfare.
Proof. Consider a problem with bads. If m− < n, the returned allocation is
optimal. For this reason, let m− ≥ n. We write P for ([n], [m]−, (u(o))o∈[m]−)
and −P for ([n], [m]−, (v(o))o∈[m]−) where v(o) = −u(o) for each o ∈ [m]
−.
We note that −P contains only pure goods. For each agent a ∈ [n] and each
bundle S ⊆ [m]−, we let va(S) denote the utility of a for S. It follows that
va(S) = −ua(S) due to additivity.
Let us consider an allocation B in P . The disutility Nash welfare in B is
dNW(B) =
∏
a∈[n](−ua(Ba)). Further, we let −B denote the same allocation
but in −P . That is, −Ba = Ba and v(−Ba) = −u(Ba) for each a ∈ [n]. We
have NW(−B) =
∏
a∈[n] va(−Ba) = dNW(B). It follows that the order induced
by the disutility Nash welfare among the allocations in P coincides with the
order induced by the Nash welfare among the allocations in −P . As a result, an
allocation is MdNW in P iff it is MNW in −P .
We next prove that an allocation in P is EFX iff it is EFX in −P . Let −B
be an EFX allocation in −P but suppose that B is not EFX in P . Hence, there
are two agents, say 1 and 2, and one pure bad o ∈ B2 such that u(B1 \ {o}) <
u(B2). Therefore, v(−B2) < v(−B1 \ {o}) holds. It follows that agent 2 is not
EFX of agent 1 for the pure good o in −B. Hence, −B is not EFX in −P .
This is a contradiction. Similarly, let B be an EFX allocation in P but suppose
that −B is not EFX in −P . We derive v(−B1) < v(−B2 \ {o}) and, therefore,
u(B2 \ {o}) < u(B1). This contradicts the EFX of B in P .
Let B be an arbitrary EFX allocation in P and −B be its corresponding EFX
allocation in −P . We have dNW(B) = NW(−B). By the result of Barman et al.
[8], n
√
NW(−B) ≥ 11.061
n
√
NW(−BOPT) where −BOPT is an MNW allocation in
−P . Let BOPT be its corresponding allocation in P . Hence, BOPT is an MdNW
allocation in P and NW(−BOPT) = dNW(BOPT). We derive that n
√
dNW(B) ≥
1
1.061
n
√
dNW(BOPT) holds for B in P .
The result follows because the algorithm returns an EFX allocation by The-
orem 3. ⋄
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Barman et al. [8] gave an example8 of a problem with pure goods, confirming
that the approximation guarantee of an EFX “good allocation” wrt the geomet-
ric mean of the maximal Nash welfare is almost tight. We observe a similar
finding for an EFX “bad allocation” and the geometric mean of the maximal
disutility Nash welfare. The approximation factor of Lemma 4 is almost tight.
We demonstrate this in Example 6.
Example 6 Consider a problem with 2 agents and (m+2) pure bads, where m
is an even number. Further, we let the utilities of agents 1 and 2 for the items
be identical: −m,−m,−1,−1, . . . ,−1.
There is one allocation, say A, that gives both pure bads valued with −m
to one of the agents, say agent 1, and all other m pure bads valued with −1 to
agent 2. It is easy to see that this allocation satisfies EFX. Moreover, dNW(A) =
2m ·m = 2m2.
Another EFX allocation, say B, gives to each agent one pure bad valued with
−m and m2 pure bads valued with −1. This one maximizes the disutility Nash
welfare and each agent receives the same disutility over the bads. Furthermore,
dNW(B) = 32m ·
3
2m =
9
4m
2. The approximation ratio of A is:
√
dNW(A)√
dNW(B)
=
√
8
9
≈
1
1.0607
.⋄
9 Future work
Our results enabled us to open up several interesting future directions. In this
section, we discuss two of these prominent lines of research.
9.1 New fairness concepts
The notion of EFX3 is a member of a more general class of fairness concepts,
imposing constraints on the sub-problems of mixed goods and pure bads in our
setting. For example, we may insist on satisfying different fairness concepts in
each of these sub-problems. More formally, this can be defined as follows.
Definition 8 (X-Y-Z-fairness) An allocation A is X-Y-Z fair if, for all a, b ∈ [n],
A is X for [m], A+ is Y for [m]+ and A− is Z for [m]−, where X, Y and Z are
fairness properties.
Examples of fairness properties are EF1, EFX, PROP (proportionality),
PROP1 (proportionality up to some item, see e.g. [17]), PROPX (proportion-
ality up to any item, see e.g. [24]), etc. From this perspective, EFX3 is equiv-
alent to EFX-EFX-EFX fairness. An interesting future direction is to design
(polynomial-time) algorithms that satisfy some of these criteria in the general
case.
8 See Example 4.3 in [8].
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9.2 New approximation results
We can also relate some of our results to other existing approximation results.
For example, as we mentioned earlier, Plaut and Roughgarden [27] proved that
the leximin solution is EFX and PO with identical utilities and pure goods.
This one returns an MEW allocation. By the result of Barman [8], it follows
that n
√
NW(Aleximin) ≥ 11.061
n
√
NW(AMNW) holds. Therefore, an leximin alloca-
tion approximates the maximal Nash welfare in this setting. We further note that
n
√
NW(AMNW) ≥ EW(AMNW) and, therefore, n
√
NW(Aleximin) ≥ 11.061EW(A
MNW)
hold, which gives us an appealing relation between the Nash welfare of an lex-
imin allocation and the egalitarian welfare of an MNW allocation. In addi-
tion, NW(AEFX) ≥ NW(Aleximin) holds for some EFX allocations because the
set of leximin allocations is a subset of the set of EFX allocations. Hence, if
n
√
NW(Aleximin) ≥ β n
√
NW(AMNW) for some β > 11.061 , then we can derive a
strictly better approximation factor than 1.061. We submit the deeper study of
these approximation guarantees as a promising direction.
10 Conclusion
We studied the problem of fairly allocating items in a multi-agent setting, sup-
posing the items can be characterized into three categories: mixed goods, pure
bads and dummy bads. We thus gave several general impossibility results in re-
gard to common fairness concepts such as EF1, EFX and EFX3. For example,
maximizing the Nash welfare with mixed goods does not give us any EF1 guar-
antees. Also, minimizing the disutility Nash welfare is not related to EF1. And,
an EFX3 allocation may not exist even with identical utilities.
Nevertheless, we identified several special cases when the considered fairness
concepts can be achieved in combination with PO. For example, with tertiary
utilities, we gave a polynomial-time algorithm for EFX and PO allocations and
an algorithm for EFX3 and PO allocations. As a second example, with identi-
cal utilities, we gave a linear-time algorithm for EFX and PO allocations. We
also proved several approximation guarantees of our algorithms wrt to the Nash,
disutility Nash and egalitarian welfares. Finally, we discussed our future direc-
tions.
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